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ARTICLE
THE COLLAPSE OF FINANCIAL FRAUD:
MEASURING BANKRUPTCY AVOIDANCE
ACTIONS
JESSICA D. GABEL, * ISAAC ASHER ** & MARY BETH BYINGTON ***

I.

A DEFINITION OF PONZI SCHEMES

Ponzi schemes lay their foundation on fraud. Once the con is
exposed, the culprits are usually stripped of their pilfered millions and
sent off to jail. Unfortunately for the victims, the process of recovering
any portion of the money they lost in the scam is, to put it mildly,
complicated. The challenge rests, in part, in differences between federal
forfeiture statutes and Bankruptcy Code principles in determining what
assets can be recovered and who is entitled to a portion of the Ponzi pie.
What is a Ponzi scheme (as defined by the courts rather than the media)?
The Second Circuit defines a Ponzi scheme as a “fraudulent investment
scheme in which money contributed by later investors is used to pay
artificially high dividends to the original investors, creating an illusion of
profitability, thus attracting new investors.” 1 The Ninth Circuit has
embraced an arguably broader description: “any sort of fraudulent
arrangement that uses later acquired funds or products to pay off
previous investors.” 2 Other courts add that the scheme did not “conduct
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
J.D. Candidate 2013, Georgia State University College of Law.
***
J.D. Candidate 2013, Georgia State University College of Law.
1
Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 439 F.3d 155, 157
n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004)).
2
Canning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added).
**
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legitimate business as represented to investors.” 3 In essence, a Ponzi
scheme is a “money in, money out” con game. 4
After the scheme collapses, as it inevitably does, Ponzi investors fall
into two broad categories. The first is the “net losers” – investors who
failed to receive a full return, or in many cases any return, on their
principal investment, 5 because their contributions were used to satisfy
other investors’ expectations.
The other broad category is “net winners” – “lucky” investors who
received redemption payments that exceed the value of their principal
investments. 6 Recoupment of fictitious profits may subject the net
winners to disgorgement of those profits and, in some instances, even
disgorgement of principal (although this largely applies only to net
winners). 7
Beyond these broad categories, there often are “feeder funds” –
various hedge funds, brokerage houses, and banks that steered large
pools of investors into the Ponzi scheme. 8 Relationships with feeder
funds enable the Ponzi schemer to sustain the scam over a longer period
of time by sweeping in thousands of smaller investors. 9
These victims may find two areas of law interacting to determine
recovery and distribution of the Ponzi scheme assets.
II.

PONZI SCHEMES UNDER FORFEITURE LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

There are marked differences between forfeiture law and
bankruptcy law, as applied to Ponzi schemes. Forfeiture provisions,
found throughout both the federal civil and criminal codes, govern

3

See Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *9 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
5
In re Smith, 132 B.R. 73, 74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
6
Id.
7
See generally Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998) (providing a general overview of Ponzi
schemes).
8
Nick S. Dhesi, The Conman and The Sheriff: SEC Jurisdiction and the Role of Offshore
Financial Centers in Modern Securities Fraud, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1366 (2010).
9
Id. Various groups, including individual investors, state regulators, federal agencies, and
bankruptcy trustees, may often target lawsuits and investigations at the feeder funds that invested
customers’ cash into Ponzi schemes. Lawrence J. Zweifach & Sophia N. Khan, Recent
Developments in Ponzi Scheme Litigation, 1844 PLI/Corp 99, 101 (2010). Such actions carry
varying degrees of success against financial firms, as most cases turn on the question of what the
investment house either knew or should have known about the legitimacy of the investment
opportunity. Id.
4
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seizure and distribution of property in response to wrongdoing. 10
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code contains statutory guidelines for when
and how assets become a part of the bankruptcy estate and how those
assets should be distributed. Both areas of law have their benefits, and
their shortcomings.
A.

FORFEITURE 11

“Forfeiture” is defined 12 as the divestiture of property without
compensation and the loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a
crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty. 13 Forfeiture has three
goals: punishment, deterrence, and restitution. 14 In essence, forfeiture
both forces a criminal defendant to disgorge ill-gotten profits 15 and
assures that the property is not used for illegal means. 16 For some
crimes, Congress has not granted any forfeiture authority at all. For
others, law enforcement can confiscate only the proceeds of the offense
itself, 17 or only the instrumentalities used to commit the offense. 18
Traditional forfeiture law, which serves as the foundation for
modern civil forfeiture, dates from ancient times, 19 and makes the res the
principal focus of the action. 20 Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding

10

DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS, Ch. §11:3. Governing Statutes (August 2011).
11
There are three basic types of forfeiture: criminal, civil, and administrative. For a more
detailed explanation of criminal forfeiture, see Sarah N. Welling & Jane Lyle Hord, Friction in
Reconciling Criminal Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Criminal Forfeiture Part, 42 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 551 (2012).
12
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004).
13
Armstrong v. Keene, 861 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
14
See infra Appendix A.I.
15
United States v. Hoover-Hankerson, 511 F.3d 164, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16
State of Kansas I-135/I-70 Drug Task Force v. 1990 Lincoln Town Car, Vin No.
1LNLM82F1LY694880, 145 P.3d 921, 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
17
Proceeds of an offense comprise any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, that
the wrongdoer would not have obtained or retained, but for the crime. Appellate Brief, United States
v. Razmilovic, Nos. 04-4543-cr(L), 04-5081-cr(CON) (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2004), 2004 WL 3589671 at
*48.
18
18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
19
Asset forfeiture can be traced to Exodus 21:28: “If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they
die: then the ox shall surely be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall
be quit.” In the Middle Ages and the law of deodand, it was stated: “[W]here a man killeth another
with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is on the
owner.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998) (citing 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 420-424 (1st Am. Ed 1847); 1 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England).
20
United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($12,390.00), 956 F.2d
801, 803 (8th Cir. 1992).
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against the seized property itself, 21 designed primarily to confiscate
property used in violation of law, and to require disgorgement of the
fruits of illegal conduct. 22 The roots of the modern criminal forfeiture
system, in comparison, arose out of the RICO statutes and the federal
drug laws. 23 Modern criminal forfeiture functions as an in personam
proceeding against the party who committed the criminal acts. 24
Civil and criminal forfeitures are usually accomplished in a fourstep process: seizure, notice, forfeiture proceedings, and recovery. 25 To
seize the asset, the government must show probable cause to believe that
the object was used in criminal activity. 26 The burden then shifts to the
citizen to show that the property should not be subject to forfeiture. 27
Once forfeiture is declared, the government’s title relates back in time to
the commission of the criminal act. 28 Nevertheless, the statutory
schemes for both civil and criminal forfeiture allow innocent owners 29 to
challenge a forfeiture action, if they have standing. 30 While restitution is

21

United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007).
Belk v. Cheshire, 583 S.E.2d 700, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
23
Modern criminal forfeiture is rooted in: 1) the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (Westlaw
2012), which was enacted to combat organized crime; and 2) the federal drug laws, 21 U.S.C.A. §
853 (Westlaw 2012), which mandate forfeiture of any property derived from or involved in a federal
narcotics offense.
24
Fleet, 498 F.3d at 1231.
25
See infra Appendix A.II.
26
See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 1012 Germantown Rd., Palm Beach
County, Fla., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that 19 U.S.C. § 1615 gives the trial
court responsibility for determining whether the government has proven probable cause (to prove
probable cause, the government must convince the judge that it had a “reasonable ground for belief
of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than a reasonable suspicion”) and then §
1615 shifts the burden to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a defense to the
forfeiture).
27
Id.
28
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (Westlaw 2012) (codifying the relation back doctrine); see also
In re Thena, Inc., 190 B.R. 407, 411 (D. Or. 1995) (stating that “upon the defendant’s conviction . . .
the United States’ rights in the forfeited property are deemed to relate back to the time the predicate
criminal acts were committed. Until conviction . . . the United States’ rights in the subject property
are not vested even though the forfeiture statute may give the United States pre-conviction or even
pre-indictment possessory rights over the property.”); United States v. Trotter, 912 F.2d 964, 965-66
(8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the purpose of the provision is to prevent people from trying to avoid
forfeiture actions through pre-conviction transfers of property that are not “arms-length”); 18
U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (Westlaw 2012).
29
See United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that “if a
third party can demonstrate that his interest in the forfeited property is exclusive of or superior to the
interest of the defendant, the third party’s claim renders that portion of the order of forfeiture
reaching his interest invalid.”). Note that the “innocent owner” doctrine applies to both criminal and
civil forfeiture.
30
See United States v. Starcevic, 766 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939-40 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (noting that
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) provides that “any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest
22
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a goal of forfeiture, the United States Attorney General has discretion
with respect to using the forfeited funds to compensate victims. This
process is called remission or mitigation. 31 Remission can mimic
distribution in bankruptcy, but it lacks the detailed statutory distribution
constructs developed under the Bankruptcy Code. 32
B.

BANKRUPTCY

As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code establishes a systematic order
of distribution of assets in bankruptcy cases. It also establishes a
comprehensive scheme for gathering property, including property that
may have left the debtor’s possession prior to the bankruptcy case, either
in legitimate or fraudulent payment of creditors or others. Both of these
components serve the bankruptcy law goal of preventing the unjust
enrichment of creditors who “run to the court.” They serve instead to
distribute assets in a fair and equitable way. Tension can arise, however,
if anticipated distribution of assets under bankruptcy principles differs
from proposed distribution under forfeiture and remission principles,
particularly if the identified “victims” of fraud are different than the
identified “creditors” in the bankruptcy case, or are given different
priority of payment than they would receive in a bankruptcy case. 33
Whether under forfeiture law or bankruptcy law, Ponzi scheme
claimants are not generally seeking payment on a mere invoice for a
delivery made six months before bankruptcy. Ponzi investors share one
common attribute: they are all victims of an elaborate con. But any
collective identity ends there. Rather, the claimants in a Ponzi scheme
have varying degrees of interests and liabilities. Ultimately, the timing
and amounts of withdrawal from the scheme separate the winners from
the losers.

in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States . . . may . . . petition the court for a
hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property,” and that “to prevail in a §
853(n) claim, a petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is
either a bona fide purchaser for value or that the petitioner possesses a right, title, or interest in the
seized property that is superior to the defendant’s right, title, or interest in the property.”); see also
Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d at 208 (stating that “a ‘bona fide purchaser for value’ must be construed
liberally to include all persons who give value to the defendant in an arms’-length transaction with
the expectation that they would receive equivalent value in return. If such persons are without
knowledge of the potential forfeitability of the defendant’s assets, they are entitled to recover under
§ 853(n)(6)(B).”).
31
Id.
32
11 U.S.C.A. § 726 (Westlaw 2012).
33
Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Handling Claims in Ponzi Scheme Bankruptcy and Receivership
Cases, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (2012).
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In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 34 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a core tenet of the Bankruptcy Code is a
debtor’s privilege to avoid fraudulent and preferential transfers. 35 The
Bankruptcy Code provides a trustee (or a debtor in possession) 36 with
these two crucial statutory tools that enable the trustee to claw funds
back from creditors (or, investors in Ponzi schemes) who received
disbursements prior to the bankruptcy. 37 Trustees can seek the return of
transfers through either (1) preference claims that allow the trustee to
avoid transfers made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing (Bankruptcy
Code section 547), or (2) fraudulent transfer claims that allow the trustee
to avoid transfers more than 90 days before bankruptcy filing
(Bankruptcy Code section 548). 38 Essentially, fraudulent transfers
diminish assets of the estate without a corresponding reduction in debt or
obligation; preferential transfers, which are the younger form of creditor
protection, deplete assets of the estate but also reduce an obligation
owing to a creditor.

34

Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Id. at 371-72.
36
In bankruptcy cases, the power to recover property for the estate is vested in either the
trustee or, in chapter 11 cases, the debtor in possession. In chapter 11 business bankruptcies, the
debtor company is referred to the debtor in possession as it attempts to reorganize its debts. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1101(1) (Westlaw 2012). Consequently, the debtor in possession (as represented by
counsel) may initiate an avoidance action. The debtor in possession is not omnipotent, however. If
the debtor in possession exhibits “fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management,” a trustee
may be appointed to replace the debtor in possession. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
The trustee then may pursue any avoidance actions that the debtor in possession would have the right
to. While most bankruptcy Ponzi schemes are ultimately chapter 7 liquidations because there is no
legitimate business to salvage, some do begin in chapter 11. In those cases, an appointment of a
trustee is immediate and necessary given the nature of business. Paul W. Bonapfel, John Mills &
Todd Neilson, The Business Bankruptcy Panel: Ponzi Schemes—Bankruptcy Court v. Federal Court
Equity Receivership, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 207 (2010). Some practitioners and judges believe
that Ponzi schemes should never be chapter 11 cases because there typically is little to nothing to
reorganize. Id. (comments by Bonapfel, J.).
37
Some Ponzi schemes fall first into a receivership and may remain there or transition into
bankruptcy. Appointed receivers can successfully pursue claw backs of fraudulent transfers under
state law. The drawback, however, is that receivers do not hold the bevy of powers a bankruptcy
trustee does under the Bankruptcy Code. If a statutory or common law receivership of the enterprise
is not in the best interests of the creditors or the estate, the receiver could initiate bankruptcy
proceedings—such as happened in the Madoff and Petters cases. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v.
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Bernard L. Madoff), No. 09-11893 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June
9, 2009), available at www.madoff.com/document/other/252_order.pdf.
38
See infra Appendix B.I.
35
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Preferences: Timing is Everything

In business situations, many creditors will experience bankruptcy
through the preference lens. 39 A preference is a payment made on the
“eve” of bankruptcy to a creditor in order to extinguish or reduce a preexisting debt. 40 The term derives from the legal presumption that, by
paying a specific creditor, an insolvent debtor has preferred that creditor
to the detriment of the larger pool of creditors 41 because the payee will
receive a greater percentage of its claim than it would have under a pro
rata general distribution together with the other creditors. 42 Often,
trustees would much rather prosecute preference claims in cases of
financial fraud because there is no good faith defense and the transfers
fall outside the realm of “ordinary course of business.” Unfortunately,
the 90-day window on preferences is a short one, and often more than 90
days pass between the last transfers and the filing of the bankruptcy. 43
Preferences are voidable transactions, meaning that the trustee can decide
whether to bring an avoidance action and that the creditor can raise a
variety of defenses. 44 Authorizing the trustee to avoid transfers made
within a short period before bankruptcy discourages creditors from
sprinting to the courthouse to “dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy.” 45 Preference recovery also levels the playing field among
creditors by providing for more equitable distribution of the debtor’s

39

Some companies may also face fraudulent transfer actions, but the average trade creditor
for a debtor in bankruptcy usually finds itself on the defending end of a preference action. See Cent.
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 371-72 (2006) (describing such a dynamic).
40
Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917) (“Preference implies paying or securing a preexisting debt of the person preferred” on the eve of bankruptcy); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277,
1288 (9th Cir. 1969) (describing a preference as one that is made within four months of bankruptcy,
discussing prior law).
41
Mosier v. Ever-Fresh Food Co. (In re IRFM, Inc.), 52 F.3d 228, 232 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that one of the underlying policies of a preference action is to prevent “a debtor from
benefitting a particular creditor on the eve of bankruptcy”).
42
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160 (1991).
43
See, e.g., Daly v. Simeone (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 325, 329 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2001) (finding that trustee established all elements of a preferential transfer); see generally
Jobin v. Matthews (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 184 B.R. 136, 139 (D. Colo. 1995) (discussing the
policies served by preference law).
44
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (Westlaw 2012) (enumerating the defenses to a trustee’s
preference action); see also Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The
bankruptcy trustee has the discretionary power to avoid and to recover preferential transfers.”);
Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 338
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A creditor against whom a preference suit is sought has the burden of
proving one of the defenses in § 547(c) by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
45
Id. at 161 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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assets. 46 Thus, any creditor that received a greater percentage payment
than other similarly situated creditors may be required to disgorge that
payment so that the whole may share pro rata. 47
The trustee’s burden of proof in preference actions is lower than in
fraudulent transfer actions because the Bankruptcy Code rebuttably
presumes that any funds, whether principal or profit, paid (or withdrawn)
within 90 days before the bankruptcy filing are an improper preference. 48
If the trustee satisfies the elements of a preference action, the burden
shifts to the preferred investor to assert perhaps the only available
affirmative defense in a Ponzi scheme: that the transaction occurred in
the “ordinary course of business.” 49 Moreover, the trustee may use
section 547 to “recover both principal investments as well as fictitious
profits earned despite any objective or subjective good-faith defense
raised by the investor.” 50 For those reasons, section 547 preference
actions are often superior to fraudulent transfer actions.
Section 547 does not grant a good faith defense to the transferee,
and the section 550 good faith defense is not available to the initial
transferee of a preferential transfer. 51 In Ponzi scheme proceedings to
recover preferences, perhaps the only viable defense is that the
withdrawal occurred in the “ordinary course of business” under section
547(c). This defense serves two purposes. First, it permits, and even
encourages, creditors to engage in normal and customary business
dealings with debtors on the brink of bankruptcy. 52 Second, it
discourages and rejects extraordinary debt collection actions or payment
terms. 53 This preference defense, however, loses its social utility in the

46

Id.
Id.
48
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (Westlaw 2012).
49
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (providing the elements of the ordinary
course of business defense).
50
Jerry J. Campos, Avoiding the Discretionary Function Rule in the Madoff Case, 55 LOY. L.
REV. 587, 600 (2009) (discussing recourse for defrauded investors of Ponzi schemes during
bankruptcy proceedings).
51
See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547, 550 (Westlaw 2012).
52
See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157 (1991) (stating that ordinary course of
business defense insulates from preference attack payments made as part of a bank’s ordinary course
of business).
53
See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY: CHAPTER 5 BANKRUPTCY CODE, CREDITORS, DEBTORS,
AND THE ESTATE § 547.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender Co., Inc. ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996) (noting
Congress’s intent to discourage unusual action by creditors during a debtor’s slide into bankruptcy).
47
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Ponzi scheme context because the very act of paying investors facilitates
the fraud rather than a legitimate business. 54
The creditor must satisfy both prongs of the ordinary course
defense. First, the creditor / preference defendant must show that the
debt arose in the ordinary course of business (e.g., an arm’s length
transaction that does not depart from the traditional or historic dealings
between the parties). 55 Second, the creditor must establish that the
payments were made in either: (a) the ordinary course of the parties’
particular business relationship (a subjective test), or (b) the ordinary
course of the business or industry in which the debtor or creditor operate
(an objective test). 56
Under this defense, payments made in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor generally escape clawback
under section 547. Should this defense be applicable in a Ponzi scheme
case where the ordinary course of the debtor’s business is fraud? 57 To
prevent net-winning Ponzi investors from using section 547(c)(2) to
defeat the trustee’s preference actions, some courts have adopted a
blanket rule that the ordinary course of business defense is simply
unavailable to “any creditor being pursued by a trustee of a Ponzi
scheme.” 58
Even though other courts are reluctant to adopt a wholesale ban on
the defense, the net-winning investor typically fails regardless because

54

See Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R. Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedge-Inv. Assocs., Inc.),
48 F.3d 470, 476 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that payments to investor were not in “ordinary course of
business” because they were made in an ongoing Ponzi scheme).
55
Id.
56
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012). The industry norm requires an examination of
the relevant industry. The inquiry becomes whether the relevant industry is that of the debtor or
creditor if they have merely a vendor/customer relationship. Because the creditor must affirmatively
assert the defense, one might argue that the appropriate industry to consider is that of the creditor.
Nonetheless, a trustee might challenge this and focus the test on the debtor’s industry. Even
assuming that the parties agree, proving the relevant industry practices requires expert testimony.
See Finley v. Mr. T’s Apparel (In re Wash. Mfg. Co.), 144 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992)
(requiring expert testimony); see also Morris v. Kan. Drywall Supply Co. (In re Classic Drywall,
Inc.), 121 B.R. 69, 78-79 (D. Kan. 1990) (finding that testimony of officer of preferred creditor
alone was sufficient).
57
For consumer cases, “the paragraph uses the phrase ‘financial affairs’ to include such
nonbusiness activities as payment of monthly utility bills.” S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978).
58
Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential
Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 185 (1998); see also Henderson v. Buchanan, 985 F.2d 1021,
1025 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating the Ninth Circuit had previously held Ponzi schemes were not true
businesses; thus any transfers related to such schemes cannot be deemed within the “ordinary course
of business”); In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (internal citation omitted)
(“Ponzi schemes are not legitimate businesses which Congress intended to protect by enactment of §
547(c)(2).”).
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the courts conclude that the “payments made to Ponzi investors cannot
satisfy the requirement that payments must be ‘made according to
ordinary business terms’ because ordinary businesses, among other
things, do not pay fictitious profits.” 59
While preference law has a litany of other defenses available to the
transferee, courts rarely, if ever, permit investors to take advantage of
them in Ponzi scheme cases, even when it comes to return of principal. 60
This tacit policy falls short of a bright-line rule, but the result is
consistent and predictable.
In contrast, the facts so fatal to a preference defense—a Ponzi
scheme’s fraudulent purpose and lack of legitimate business
operations—are not necessarily fatal to fraudulent transfer action
defenses. Thus, that body of law remains ripe with uncertainty.
2.

Fraudulent Transfers: Intent

Asset depletion often takes the form of gratuitous transfers for little
or no value on the eve of bankruptcy. Regardless of a Ponzi investor’s
status as a victim of the scheme (and any related recovery they might
receive as a result of a forfeiture action), bankruptcy trustees routinely
use section 548 to recover payments made to the investors and reallocate
those recoveries to the larger universe of defrauded investors, which may
or may not include those persons who the government considers to be
victims. 61
For a fraudulent transfer claim to succeed in recovering assets that
left the debtor’s estate prior to bankruptcy, under section 548, a
bankruptcy trustee may proceed under a theory of either actual fraud 62 or
constructive fraud. 63 The trustee must show either that the transferor’s

59

McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. at 185; see also Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1339-40
(10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a bright-line rule that section 547(c)(2) should never apply in the context
of Ponzi schemes, but holding that the payments were not in the ordinary course of business);
Inskeep v. Grosso (In re Fin. Partners, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 629, 637-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding
that Ponzi investors were not protected by ordinary course of business defense).
60
See, e.g., Grosso, 116 B.R. at 637-38 (holding that Ponzi investors were not protected by
ordinary course of business defense).
61
See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 434 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1997) (applying section 548 to Ponzi investors).
62
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of transfer made
with actual intent to defraud).
63
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of transfer for
less than reasonably equivalent value).
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actual or imputed intent was to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors 64 or
that the transferor was under a certain kind of financial distress when she
made the transfer and did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the
transfer. 65 As an equitable objective, the latter recognizes that any
significant disparity between the value received and the value
surrendered will significantly harm innocent creditors.” 66 This approach
considers the substance rather than the form of the transaction 67 by
recognizing that, even absent conspiratorial intent, paying a net-winner
Ponzi investor will impair other investors because the “profit”
represented by the payment was either imaginary or simply robbed from
Peter to pay Paul. 68
In practice, the distinction between constructive and actual fraud
seems insignificant. Constructive fraud takes more legwork (i.e.,
discovery) to prove, but the result would seem to be the same in either
case: the innocent investor must return funds. 69
The “actual fraud” theory requires that the trustee prove that the
Ponzi operator (i.e., debtor) made the transfers to the investor “[w]ith
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” the creditors (i.e. the losing
investors). 70 Unlike the garden variety fraudulent transfer action where
proving actual intent can be a time-intensive process, “[t]he mere
existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish actual intent” to
defraud. 71 Ponzi scheme operators often admit, sometimes in a plea

64

See, e.g., Bauman v. Bliese (In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc.), 326 B.R. 843, 848, 852
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that trustee successfully established debtor’s intent to defraud
under section 548(a)(1)(A)).
65
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)(II) (Westlaw 2012).
66
In re Dayton Title Agency, Inc., 292 B.R. 857, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003).
67
See, e.g., Cooper v. Centar Inv. Ltd. (In re TriGem Am. Corp.), 431 B.R. 855, 862 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2010) (reasoning that it was necessary to look at the entire substance of the transaction in
evaluating whether earmarking doctrine applied to fraudulent transfer action).
68
In a Ponzi scheme, “[t]he fraud consists of funneling proceeds received from new investors
to previous investors in the guise of profits from the alleged business venture, thereby cultivating an
illusion that a legitimate profit-making business opportunity exists and inducing further investment.”
Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991).
69
See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483 n.3 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2002) (discussing the two theories under which a trustee can pursue fraudulent transfers).
70
11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
71
Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
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agreement, the “actual intent” element. 72 Thus, a Ponzi scheme provides
a presumptive element of actual fraud. 73
In contrast, the “constructive fraud” theory is a two-part analysis.
First, it requires that the trustee demonstrate that the transfer (payment)
to the investor occurred for less than “reasonably equivalent value” in
exchange for the payment. 74 Profits that the debtor disburses via
collections from later investors cannot amount to a “reasonably
equivalent” exchange for the winning investor’s principal investment. 75
The second part of “constructive fraud” requires that the trustee
demonstrate that one of four financial events occurred: (1) the debtor was
insolvent on the date of the payment or was rendered insolvent because
of it, (2) the debtor was engaged or about to engage in business for which
the assets remaining after the payment constituted “unreasonably small
capital,” (3) the debtor intended to incur debts beyond its ability to pay
them at maturity, or (4) the debtor made the transfer to or for the benefit
of an insider under a separate agreement and not in the ordinary course
of business. 76
The insolvency component of constructive fraud 77 is somewhat
straightforward as courts regularly hold Ponzi schemes to be insolvent
from inception. 78 Under this theory, recovery of distributions made to an
investor in excess of the investment are generally recoverable. 79 The
constructive fraud theory may nevertheless insulate some or all of the net
winner’s principal investment. For payouts less than or equal to the
amount of the creditor’s principal investment, courts often conclude that
72

See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 433 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1997) (“[T]he criminal conviction of [the defendant] based on the debtors’ operation of a Ponzi
scheme conclusively establishes fraudulent intent . . . .”).
73
See In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d at 704 (explaining that a Ponzi scheme by itself is
enough to establish transfers were made with actual fraudulent intent).
74
Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 261 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stone v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc. (In re Hennings Feed and Crop Care, Inc.), 365
B.R. 868, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007).
75
See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of
transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value).
76
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV) (Westlaw 2012).
77
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (requiring that transferor was insolvent at time of
transfer or became insolvent as a result).
78
See, e.g., Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343 B.R. 615, 650 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2006) (“[G]iven the undisputed evidence that Canyon was operating a Ponzi scheme from the
time it commenced operations, the Court may find as a matter of law that the Debtor intended to
incur debts beyond its ability to repay.”).
79
See, e.g., Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou
Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 843 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that each transfer of fictitious
profits was for less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439
B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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the creditor gave reasonably equivalent value, 80 such that the trustee may
recover only the net profits paid to the investor under the constructive
fraud theory, unless the trustee can establish that the investor lacked
good faith. 81
Under section 548(c), a transferee may retain a transfer if the
transferee (1) takes for value and (2) takes in good faith (typically limited
to return of principal). The defendant / transferee must prove both “good
faith” and “value.” In Bayou III, “value” was not at issue, but the court
devoted considerable analysis to section 548(c)’s “good faith” prong. 82
The court observed that “good faith” is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code or in worthwhile legislative history. 83 Instead, the court examined
case law to define and apply “good faith.” 84
According to Bayou III, the “good faith” element of section 548(c)
is determined by objective inquiry; a transferee’s subjective good faith is
This objective perspective asks what the transferee
irrelevant. 85
objectively knew or should have known in deciding whether the
transferee accepted a payment in good faith. 86 Objective good faith does
not exist if (i) the surrounding circumstances would place a reasonable
person on inquiry notice of the debtor’s fraudulent objective, and (ii)
diligent inquiry would have revealed the fraud. 87 Under this approach,
the Bayou III court embraces the Manhattan Fund test, which “requires
either that: (1) the transferee was not on ‘inquiry notice’; or (2) if on
notice, the transferee was ‘diligent in its investigation’ of the
transferor.” 88
In determining what constitutes “inquiry notice,” an investor in a
Ponzi scheme is presumed to be on inquiry notice if she “knew or should
know of information” or a “red flag” placing her “objectively ‘on alert

80

Fisher v. Sellis (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2000) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]o the extent of invested principal, payments from the debtor
are deemed to be made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. . . . Payments in excess of
amounts invested are considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a return on
legitimate investment activity.”).
81
For an example of a court adopting this holding, see Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771
(9th Cir. 2008).
82
In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. at 844.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. (citing Bear Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund), 397 B.R. 1, 23
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
86
Id. at 845 (quoting Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In re Agric. Research and Tech.
Grp., Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1990)).
87
Id.
88
Id. (citing In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 22).
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that there was a potential problem with the Fund’ such that the transferee
‘should have attempted to learn more.’” 89 The investor transferee need
not have actual knowledge of some underlying fraud to be on inquiry
notice. 90
Notwithstanding the purportedly objective nature of the good faith
defense, the Bayou III court recognized that good faith cannot exist in a
vacuum: “[T]o disregard objective evidence of the transferee’s subjective
good faith intent would fundamentally distort the concept of good
faith.” 91 The court identified several factors that would negate a finding
of good faith for purposes of section 548, which merge elements of
inquiry notice and diligence. Those factors include whether: (1) the
transferee knew the fraudulent purpose of the transfer; (2) there was
underlying fraud; (3) the transferor had an unfavorable financial
condition or was insolvent; (4) the nature of the transfer was improper; or
(5) the transfer was voidable. 92 In essence, as a matter of law, the
transferee bears the burden of establishing that he or she was not on
inquiry notice. 93
Despite the societal tendency to label Ponzi scheme investors
“victims,” courts have been reluctant to construe the inquiry notice prong
broadly in a manner that parallels the concept of strict liability in tort
law. 94 Once the inquiry notice prong is satisfied, a transferee’s failure to
conduct a “diligent investigation” negates the good faith defense. In
other words, an investor on inquiry notice must mitigate presumptive
notice by performing a thorough investigation. 95 Simply ignoring the
warning signs defeats the good faith defense. 96
Moreover, the “diligent investigation” prong of section 548(c)
cannot be met simply by speaking with the Ponzi operator. 97 After all,
those individuals have a tremendous incentive to obscure truth, and, in
some cases, have perfected the art of placating investors. Bayou III held
that an “inconclusive diligent investigation” that failed to uncover the

89

Id. at 845 (quoting In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 23).
Id.
91
Id. at 849.
92
Id. at 845-46.
93
Id.
94
See Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that the presence of any circumstance placing the transferee on inquiry notice with
respect to the financial condition of the transferor may be a contributing factor in depriving the
transferee of the good faith defense) (internal citation omitted).
95
In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 369 B.R. at 846.
96
Id. at 847.
97
Id.
90
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fraud will not, on its own, prove good faith. 98 The investor must
demonstrate that the reason he withdrew funds was “not because he had
some information that there was some infirmity in the fund, but because
of some other reason personal to him and extraneous to the well-being of
the fund and its remaining investors.” 99 In summary, in order to pass the
Bayou III good faith hurdle, a Ponzi investor would need to show the
following two items. First, an investor must establish that she made a
diligent inquiry, the results of which signaled the “all clear.” Second,
she has to show that the withdrawal was the product of some extraneous
purpose wholly unrelated to red flags. 100
As to the second item, Bayou III listed specific examples of
extraneous circumstances that would tend to demonstrate a good faith
purpose for withdrawing funds (which would permit an investor to retain
her principal investment while nevertheless returning any fictitious
profits): 101 (1) a pension plan liquidating its Bayou investment (along
with other investments) to comply with ERISA; (2) a trust withdrawing
funds for the sole purpose of funding a home purchase; (3) a partnership
requesting a redemption as part of a liquidation of assets in advance of a
partner’s death; (4) a parent withdrawing funds to cover expenses of a
newborn child and private school tuition expenses; (5) Bayou returning
an investment and closing an account after an investor’s balance fell
below the minimum levels accepted by Bayou; and (6) a fund seeking a
partial satisfaction of its Bayou investment to fulfill withdrawal requests
from its own investors and to pay a bank loan. 102
Bayou III’s diligence and objectivity requirements perhaps went
farther than other courts in denying the good faith defense. 103 But Bayou
III also provided an arbitrary set of exceptions, which seem to drift back
toward subjective motivations for withdrawing funds. For example,
using withdrawals to fund the purchase of a home or the birth of a child
may be laudable, if not sympathetic, reasons. But the court also
98

Id. at 851.
Id.
100
Id. at 850.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 853.
103
Some courts have, however, strayed in that direction. See Smith v. Suarez (In re IFS Fin.
Corp.), 417 B.R. 419, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that defendants were not good faith
transferees where evidence indicated that they knew or should have known of the illegitimacy of the
investments and that board member acted as siblings’ “agent” such that, under agency law, his
knowledge of fraud was imputed to the principal); see also Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16, Wing v. Nathenson, No. 2:09-cv-109-DB
(D. Utah Sept. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 5129177 (arguing that the transferee must undertake a diligent
investigation when put on inquiry notice of suspicious circumstances).
99
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permitted a feeder fund to pay off its own bank loan. The court initially
defined something arguably close to strict liability in Ponzi scheme
redemptions, but then whipsawed, carving out exceptions for a select few
types of withdrawals. While the court’s gesture was an attempt to soften
the hardship of losing money by inserting a scintilla of fairness, it still
resulted in disparate treatment. The judgment merely realigned the
“haves” and the “have-nots.”
Several articles have harshly criticized Bayou III for placing
restrictions on the good faith defense’s applicability in Ponzi schemes. 104
Notably, commentators object to what they perceive as Bayou III’s
wholesale rejection of “decades of tradition interpreting fraudulent
transfer law since its inception in the Statute of Elizabeth” 105 and laying
the foundation for eliminating the good faith defense under section
548(c). Critics argue that the Bayou III configuration of the good faith
defense causes investors to lose the defense if they fail to ask the right
questions. But that is perhaps the best result, and one that unifies
investors instead of creating factions. Indeed, a healthy dose of
Schadenfreude 106 calms the maddening crowd by spreading shared blame
and shared pain among all. Nor should the good faith defense be limited
because of burden on the courts, which would have to adjudicate the
massive amount of claw back actions. The good faith defense’s
elimination is fortified by the fact that it will achieve equity among all
creditors. 107
Regardless, Bayou III’s influence on the good faith defense would
be short-lived. The jilted investors appealed to the district court, and the
result was Bayou IV. 108 While the district court affirmed many of the
bankruptcy court’s holdings, it categorically rejected the good faith
analysis. 109 The district court held that, when considering red flags of
104

For an example of that critique, see Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers:
The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished, 28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16
(2009) (critiquing Bayou III’s treatment of the good faith defense); see also Kathy L. Yeatter,
Investors Beware: Bankruptcy Court Decision Takes Narrow View of “Good Faith” Under §
548(C), 28-Feb. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 49 (2009) (arguing that the facts of Bayou III supported the
good faith defense).
105
Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers: The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the
Diligent Are Punished, 28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. at 16.
106
“Schadenfreude” is where pleasure is derived from the misfortune of others.
Schadenfreude Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
schadenfreude?view=uk (last visited May 13, 2012).
107
Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (discussing the Bankruptcy Court’s
broad equitable powers).
108
Christian Bros. High Sch. v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 439
B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
109
Id. at 316-17.
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fraud in connection with the investor’s related conduct, courts should
evaluate the specific circumstances of each transfer. 110 Consequently,
Bayou IV reformulated the good faith analysis as whether a transferee
reasonably should have known of the fraudulent intent underlying the
transfer. 111
Bayou IV also concluded that the objective reasonable investor
standard applies to both the inquiry notice and diligent investigation
prongs of the good faith defense. The district court determined that the
bankruptcy court’s analysis of “red flags” that included “some infirmity
in Bayou or the integrity of its management,” was overly broad and
untenable. 112 Rather, it is “information suggesting insolvency or a
fraudulent purpose in making a transfer that triggers inquiry notice.” 113
Furthermore, Bayou IV rejected the bankruptcy court’s
interpretation of the good faith defense’s diligent investigation prong.114
The district court concluded that the good faith defense could not be
forced into a strict box of requiring the investor to prove that she
withdrew funds for a purpose unrelated to any red flags of fraud. 115
Insisting on such rigidity, according to the district court, ignores the good
faith defense’s historical objectivity and would force judges to measure
the transferee’s subjective motivations and intentions. 116 Instead, the
district court ruled that if “the transferee can meet its burden of
demonstrating that a diligent investigation would not have led to
discovery of the fraud, it may prevail on [the diligent investigation
prong],” and defeat the specter of inquiry notice. 117
Despite the district court’s more generous construction of the good
faith defense, the defendant-funds still lost when the issue proceeded to

110

Id. at 313.
Id. at 311.
112
Id. at 314 (quoting Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re
Bayou Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R.
284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 315-17.
115
Id. at 317.
116
Id.
117
Id. There are other defenses available in fraudulent transfer actions aside from the good
faith defense embodied in section 548(c), including the in pari delicto doctrine, which is the
common law notion that “a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a defendant if the plaintiff bears
fault for the claim.” Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 390 B.R. 64, 78 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (internal citation omitted). Growing in its success rate, it and any other defenses outside of
good faith are beyond the scope of this Article.
111
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trial. 118 The jury found that the funds failed to make the required
investigation, and the court ordered the funds to return the entire amount
paid to them. 119
The scope of the good faith defense, however, remains unsettled as
the Southern District of New York continues to consider its application
in Ponzi schemes. In a case that expands the defense to its widest berth
yet, Picard v. Katz, 120 a Madoff by-product, the district court staunchly
rejected the objective, or inquiry notice, approach, at least in the context
of a Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) trusteeship. 121 The
court noted that, in cases involving bankrupt securities firms, bankruptcy
law incorporates certain elements of securities law. 122 Consequently, the
court concluded that the “safe harbor” provision of section 546(e) barred
the SIPA trustee, Irving Picard, from pursuing any claims based upon
either preference law or constructive fraud. 123
The trustee was left only with the actual fraud claims under section
548(a)(1)(A), which the court then narrowly construed. 124 With respect
to intent, the court held, where a SIPA trustee was involved, the trustee
must meet the level of scienter required in a securities fraud case: “proof
of more than negligent nonfeasance.” 125 Focusing on the plain language
of the Bankruptcy Code, the court rejected Picard’s argument that
applying the safe harbor ran counter to the legislative goals. 126 The court
also concluded that the aims of the legislation would be served because
the recovery actions in the Madoff case threatened the sort of market
upheaval SIPA was designed to avoid. 127
Addressing the good faith defense, the court reasoned that although
securities law will not protect an investor from “willful blindness” to
obvious fraud, “[a] securities investor has no inherent duty to inquire
118

Joel Rosenblatt, Bayou Group Estate Wins $13 Million from Hedge Funds for Fraud
Investors, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2011, 9:08 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-13/bayougroup-estate-wins-13-million-from-hedge-funds-for-fraud-investors.html.
119
Id.
120
Picard v. Katz, No. 11 Civ. 3605 (JSR), 2011 WL 4448638, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2011).
121
Id. at *5. When a brokerage firm fails, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(“SIPC”) transfers the failed brokerage’s accounts to a different securities brokerage firm. If the
SIPC is unable to arrange the accounts’ transfer, the failed firm is liquidated. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78aaa et seq. (Westlaw 2012) (detailing the procedure by which SIPC winds up a failed brokerage).
In the Madoff case, the liquidation began under SIPA and flowed into the bankruptcy court.
122
Katz, 2011 WL 4448638, at *2.
123
Id.
124
Id. at *1.
125
Id. at *5 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976)).
126
Id. at *2–3.
127
Id. at *3.
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about his stockbroker, and SIPA creates no such duty.” 128 According to
the court’s formulation, the good faith defense remains available even if
an investor encounters “suspicious circumstances” but fails to investigate
further. 129 Nonetheless, the case ultimately settled with Picard bringing
in more than $160 million in the Katz case. 130
Katz directly conflicted with another Southern District of New York
opinion in the Madoff case, Picard v. Merkin, 131 decided only a month
earlier. In Merkin, the district court ruled that the complaint—which
alleged fraudulent transfers based on both actual and constructive
fraud—could survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In contrast to
Judge Rakoff (in Katz), Judge Wood (in Merkin) determined that both
the Bankruptcy Code and New York state fraudulent transfer law focus
squarely on the intent of the debtor-transferor and not the intent of the
transferee. 132 The court concluded that the consideration of the section
546(e) safe harbor defense was premature, as the court had not yet
crossed that bridge.
Given two wildly different interpretations of the good faith defense
within the confines of the same case, the only thing that is clear is the
unpredictability and inconsistency of the application of the good faith
defense. A litigant attempting to ascertain the legal landscape of the
good faith defense in Ponzi schemes would be no worse off if she flipped
a coin.
What is clear is that the actual fraud theory may be used to recover
the entire amount paid to the investor, whereas constructive fraud may be
unable to reach some, or all, of a victim’s principal investment. Where a
transfer is avoided as a constructive fraud, the trustee’s recovery is
limited to the profits the investor received over and above the principal
investment, 133 unless the trustee proves that the innocent investor lacked
128

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
130
Richard Sandomir & Ken Belson, Mets’ Owners Agree to Settle Madoff Suit for $162
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/sports/
baseball/mets-owners-pay-162-million-to-settle-madoff-suit.html?pagewanted=all.
131
Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 MC 0012(KMW),
2011 WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011).
132
Id. at *8-13. Under New York state law, however, the transferee’s intent (or lack thereof)
can be considered an affirmative defense.
133
See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483 (D. Conn. 2002)
(discussing the trustee’s attempt to recover interest payments under a constructive fraud theory); 11
U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (Westlaw 2012); see also Kapila v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Pearlman), 440 B.R.
900, 905-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (stating an affirmative “good faith” defense is available to
individuals in actual fraud cases); Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275
B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“All recipients of avoidable transfers from a debtor
operating a Ponzi scheme are entitled to raise good faith as a defense.”).
129

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7

606

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

good faith, in which case the trustee may use constructive fraud to
recover the investor’s principal. 134 The law of preferences contains no
corresponding good faith caveat. 135
3.

Calculating “Value” into the Good Faith Equation of Section
548(c)

The two most recent Madoff cases discussed in the preceding
section examined the “good faith” prong of section 548(c) without
touching upon the “for value” component of the defense, the application
of which itself remains unclear in Ponzi cases. This is perhaps due to the
fact that “value” is defined in section 548(d). Value was an issue in one
Ponzi scheme case where the bankruptcy court considered whether
equity-denominated investments (as opposed to the more traditional debt
investments) that were repaid qualified as “value” for purposes of the
section 548(c) defense. In re International Management Associates, LLC
(“IMA”) 136 illustrates the different notions and interplay of defenses in
fraudulent transfer actions in Ponzi schemes. Given the lack of authority
on “for value” in the context of equity investments, IMA would later be
catapulted to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by route of the rarely
used direct appeal. 137
Recall that a transferee is entitled to keep the transfer if she can
prove that she acted in “good faith” and that she provided the transferor
“value” in exchange for the transfer. 138 To limit its focus to the “value”
question, the court assumed that that trustee had established his prima
facie avoidance case under federal and state law. 139
By the language of section 548(c), the typical fraudulent transfer
defendant can establish an affirmative defense to a trustee’s avoidance
134

See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under the constructive
fraud theory, the receiver may only recover ‘profits’ above the initial outlay, unless the receiver can
prove a lack of good faith, in which case the receiver may also recover the amounts that could be
considered return of principal.”).
135
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (Westlaw 2012) (allowing recovery of any transfer that provided
the transferee with more than he would have recovered otherwise).
136
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6506657 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Dec. 1, 2009), aff’d, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011).
137
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. Dec. 1, 2009) (order certifying case for direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals).
138
11 U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (Westlaw 2012).
139
The relevant facts included: (a) that the investor defendant tendered an essentially
worthless equity interest to the debtor in exchange for the transfer; and (b) that the investor
defendant held an unasserted claim against the debtor that arose at the time the investor defendant
originally invested as an equity holder in the debtor. In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 2009 WL
6506657, at *8-9.
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action by showing that it provided “value” in exchange for any transfer
received from the debtor. The “value” inquiry exists independently of
the question of “good faith.” 140 In Ponzi schemes, however, investor
defendants are not typical defendants. The transfer is made on account
of the investor defendant’s equity interest, an interest that arguably never
had any value (contrasted to a debt investment, where the principal
investment does constitute value). Consequently, the availability of the
section 548(c) defense is in doubt in Ponzi schemes because any
cognizable value disappears to the inescapable bottom of a black hole.
The bankruptcy court in IMA correctly questioned whether an exchange
for value with respect to an equity interest is ever possible in a Ponzi
scheme. 141 In IMA, the court adopted the well-established money-in,
money-out principle that a “defrauded Ponzi scheme investor has a claim
for the return of its principal investment based on fraud and that the
satisfaction of this fraud claim through transfers, at least up to the
amount of principal, constitutes ‘value’ for purposes of the defense to a
fraudulent transfer claim under Section 548(c) and equivalent state
laws.” 142 But the trustee sought an exception to the general rule when
the victim’s principal investment is in the form of equity. The trustee
argued that, in a Ponzi scheme, a transfer on account of an equity interest
cannot be an exchange for value: the distinction between IMA and the
“run of the mill” Ponzi rests in the equity nature of the fraudulent
investments that the debtors offered in their capital contribution
structure. 143
The trustee’s argument has some attractive features, especially its
promotion of the equality of distribution. Ponzi victims would be placed
in a one-size-fits-all box without regard to the strategic positioning of
who got what out and when. The bankruptcy court found the trustee’s
foothold persuasive but not authoritative. Ultimately, the court had to
decide between equal application (principal Ponzi payments constitute

140

See id. at *8 (stating that an adverse ruling on trustee’s motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking a ruling “that, as a matter of law, an investor who made an equity investment in
the debtors and received payments did not receive the payments ‘for value,’” did not “fully negate
the Trustee’s ability to defeat the [section 548(c)] defense, because the defense also requires that the
transfer be in ‘good faith’”).
141
See id. at *9 (acknowledging the trustee’s argument that the general rule “that the victim of
a Ponzi scheme has a claim for the return of the principal it invested based on fraud and that
payments up to the amount of the invested principal are made in exchange for ‘value’” does not
apply in situations where the “victim’s investment takes the form of an equity investment,” but
concluding “that interpretation of the fraudulent transfer laws has made no distinction based on the
form of the investment.”).
142
Id. at *10.
143
Id. at *9.
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value) and equal distribution (Ponzi equity participation and debt receive
identical treatment) under the law. 144 The court held that the former rule
prevailed, and that the investors received “value” to the extent of the
invested principal. 145 Although the court noted the fairness of an
alternate rule favoring equal distribution regardless of whether the
investments took the form of debt or equity, 146 the court found no
authority to support such a rule. Rather, the bankruptcy court in IMA
followed the lead of the only United States Court of Appeals that had
discussed the question. 147
Nevertheless, given the importance of the issue and the glut of
Ponzi scheme cases in the United States, 148 the bankruptcy court certified
the question for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. 149 The bankruptcy court justified the direct appeal
by suggesting that numerous judges, trustees, receivers, and parties need
guidance and a definitive rule, 150 that current law requires court to fall
back on a general default rule established for debt investments to
conclude that “investors who held equity interests in the fraudulent
scheme from the outset could assert the ‘value’ defense,” 151 and that it
would be useful for the court of appeals to establish the rules of play for
equity interests in Ponzi schemes. 152 Whether the equity holders
constitute a special team, the IMA court believed that every investor
should get equal play time and distributions.
In IMA, the parties fundamentally disagreed whether equity interests
should be analyzed differently than debt-based claims. 153 The Eleventh
Circuit ultimately affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision that equity
and debt-based claims in Ponzi schemes are on par with one another. 154
Given the specificity of the issue as it pertains to equity claims, the court
punted on whether section 548(c) should be available to the universe of

144

“[T]he Court concludes that no principled basis exists for a different result depending on
the technical form of the fraudulent investment.” Id. at *10.
145
Id.
146
Id. at *9.
147
See Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing “reasonably equivalent value”).
148
Id. at *3.
149
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at *1 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *9-10
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009), aff’d, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011).
154
Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Ponzi scheme investment clawbacks, irrespective of equity or debt status.
Given the expanding universe of Ponzi schemes and defrauded investors,
the “value” component is as much a recurring issue as good faith. 155
Under IMA, substance governs over the transaction’s form to permit
Ponzi victims to retain payment of and submit claims for funds up to the
amount of the principal investment, 156 such that fraudulent transfer law
reallocates losses equally among all Ponzi victims. Notions of equity
and fairness may, counter-intuitively, dictate disparate treatment for
equity investments. An equally compelling argument is that investors
should not be penalized for the manner in which a Ponzi fraudster
perpetrated the scheme.
Either way, the general rule—that the repayment of principal
constitutes value in exchange for the transfer irrespective of whether the
investment was debt or equity—may be running into overtime. Judicial
discontent from Bayou to IMA has generated some congressional
conversations about rulemaking in Ponzi cases. Currently, given the
number of jurisdictions and the growth in the Ponzi scheme largesse,
there is a “potential for inconsistent results, delayed adjudication, and
skyrocketing costs.” 157
The demolition of the good faith defense for investors in cash-in,
cash-out Ponzi schemes (where “debts were incurred as part of an
extraordinary and unlawful enterprise and payments came from other
people’s money”) 158 leaves a sour taste in the mouth. Yet, to implement
a primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., equality of the
distribution), it is a necessary evil that ensures that all creditors—not just
the most friendly, necessary, lucky and/or aggressive creditors—recover
at least part of their claims.
In determining the good faith of “innocent” investor-victims, the
key practical question is often: were the investors expecting a
commercially reasonable rate of return, for “equivalent value and good
faith,” or were they relying on promises that were, in essence, “too good
155

See, e.g., Karen E. Nelson, Note, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme Avoidance
Law and the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1456, 1480-89 (2011) (arguing that courts
should expand the definition of value to account for both the time value and opportunity costs of
withdrawals in order to arrive at a more equitable solution for winning investors).
156
In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 2009 WL 6506657, at *10; see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 305 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts “have been invoked to the end that fraud will not
prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent
substantial justice from being done”).
157
Tally M. Weiner, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 236 (2009) (discussing clawbacks, preferences, and fraudulent transfers in
the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
158
Id. at 224.
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to be true”? 159 In In re Carrozzella & Richardson, a Connecticut district
court found that guaranteed 15% interest payments were reasonable and
treated the payments as favorably as any other trade creditor, like the
utility company. 160 An Ohio bankruptcy court, however, found returns
of 12% to 24% to be an unreasonable rate of return in the context of a
Ponzi scheme. 161 This split between the courts perpetuates inconsistency
and unpredictability. For some investors, section 548(c) provides a total
shield from a clawback action, but for others the defense is more of a
brass ring hanging just out of reach.
On another aspect of investor responsibility, analogous to good
faith, some courts assign different levels of responsibility depending on
the role the investor plays in the overall scheme. 162 Sometimes, courts
justify clawbacks in part by viewing typical investors as partially
responsible for perpetuating a Ponzi fraud. 163 Courts raise the bar of
responsibility even higher for brokers that feed hungry investors into
Ponzi schemes. While brokers may be unknowing co-conspirators, they
do earn commissions for placing customers with the fraudulent funds.
The commissions they receive from Ponzi funds are subject to avoidance
actions, and some courts reject a good faith defense as applied to
commissions earned by steering investors to Ponzi funds. 164 In World
Vision, not only did the court reject the brokers’ good faith defense, but it
also deemed their actions of soliciting new investors, which perpetuated
the illegal Ponzi scheme, to be fraudulent. 165
As IMA, World Vision, Bayou III, and Bayou IV demonstrate, the
applicability and even definition of good faith is in flux. Additionally,
the iterations of good faith from these cases fail to address the reality that
early investors benefit from the misfortunes of subsequent investors.
Holding fast to the antediluvian concepts of good faith effectively hardly
approaches a solution. The status quo contributes to drawn-out litigation

159

Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D. Conn. 2002).
Id. at 483-84, 484 n.7, 490-91.
161
See In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 972, 985-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that the
investors did not give reasonably equivalent value).
162
See, e.g., In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at
*3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009) (discussing the potential different levels of responsibility of
debt and equity investors).
163
E.g., In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 488 (“Further, by helping the debtor
perpetuate his illegal scheme, the transfers between the debtor and investors only exacerbated the
harm to the debtor’s creditors by increasing the amount of claims, while diminishing the debtor’s
estate.”).
164
See Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275 B.R. 641, 658-61
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting such a defense).
165
Id. at 657.
160
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over the standards, customs, practices, sophistication, and experience
generally possessed by the individual investors—and that is just to
establish inquiry notice. Once the investor is on inquiry notice, there is
still another layer of litigation remaining that considers whether a
“diligent investigation” would have discovered the fraudulent purpose of
the transfer. The Bayou good faith litigation boiled down to a question
over the investors’ knowledge or suspicions about “some potential
infirmity” that would trigger an investigation into their investment. 166
But questioning what a “reasonably prudent institutional hedge fund
investor” would do diminishes an already starved estate. In contrast,
eliminating the good faith defense focuses on the real problem of
maximizing those assets for the benefit of all investors. The Madoff case
typifies how the bacteria of good faith can infect even the fundamental
chore of calculating loss.
III. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AND BANKRUPTCY AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
The differences between the Bankruptcy Code and federal forfeiture
schemes are most clearly observed when civil or criminal forfeiture
actions are initiated against property that is in the debtor’s estate, or
when involuntary bankruptcy is filed after the forfeitures have been
filed. 167 If the conflicting interests—criminal and bankruptcy—can
create an arrangement that effectively segregates property, then the
problem would be an easy one. Unfortunately, in many cases, early
diplomatic negotiations are the exception and not the rule.
The first problem for the bankruptcy trustee in these cases is one of
timing. After the government has seized property, the time limit for the
bankruptcy trustee to file avoidance actions will likely run out while the
trustee is waiting for his claims to the forfeited property to be heard. 168
The second problem is one of proof. Once assets of the estate are
seized in forfeiture, the trustee must try to challenge the forfeiture openly
or in an ancillary proceeding. Because the trustee is a bona fide
purchaser for value, he will likely be successful in an ancillary

166

Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC),
396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
167
United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, 2010 WL 4064809, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
14, 2010) (noting that the trustee showed the accounts belonged to RRA (not defendant) but that
government argues that third party cannot have superior claim to proceeds of fraud).
168
See United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Those payments could
have been reclaimed under the trustee’s avoiding powers and made available to all of the bilked
investors.”).
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proceeding. But if other parties have an interest in the property, it
remains the province of the judge to decide who receives the property;
hence, the difficulties the trustee faces in amassing the estate. 169
The trustee’s action is structured to stop the “run on the bank”
mentality of creditors, and to put them in an orderly line. While the
forfeiture statutes do provide a resource for restitution, they do not
delineate a broad system for gathering and distributing those assets
among the victims. 170 Also, because only small subsets of victims file
third party claims against forfeited property, there is high potential for
inequitable results.
To further complicate matters, the distinction between civil and
criminal forfeiture seems to be not well defined in Ponzi scheme cases.
Because of expansion and modification of forfeiture powers under the
amendments passed in 2000, and the fact that civil forfeiture need not
await conviction, the government typically includes a civil forfeiture
allegation in a criminal indictment. In many cases the government will
seize property from many persons, commence a civil forfeiture
proceeding, file a criminal indictment, name the property in the
indictment, and subsequently abandon the civil forfeiture actions. 171 The
forfeiture procedures found in the RICO statutes, which are often applied
in Ponzi scheme cases, also allow for the forfeiture of items obtained
with both legal and illegal money. 172
When the government is the one distributing the seized cash in
Ponzi cases, conflicts may arise among “creditors” and “victims.” The
business used to perpetrate fraud may be quasi-legitimate with real

169

See generally Appellant Brief, Herbert Stettin, as Chapter 11 Trustee of Rothstein
Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., v. United States, No. 11-10676-B (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011); see also
Appellant Brief, Herbert Stettin, as Chapter 11 Trustee of Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A. v. United
States, No. 11-10676-B (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2011).
170
Frykholm, 362 F.3d at 417.
171
This was the procedure in the Scott Rothstein case. The government seized personal
property as well as assets titled in the name of the law firm. The court placed the burden of proof on
the trustee to prove that the funds from the law firm were derived from a legitimate source. This is
pending on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, 2010 WL
4064809, (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010).
172
See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 984 (Westlaw 2012) (relieving the government of the burden
of tracing such criminal proceeds in certain cases, but only within a short time period). But see
United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that once a defendant has
commingled legitimate funds with illegitimate funds in money-laundering such that they cannot be
divided without difficulty, the government must satisfy its forfeiture judgment through the substitute
asset provision of 21 U.S.C. §853(p)). This could be bothersome because under 18 U.S.C. §
983(a)(3)(C) the government could seize an asset using civil forfeiture and put it in a criminal
indictment and possibly prevent another party from contesting it until the issue has been resolved
under 21 U.S.C. § 853(k).
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clients and customers whose money was not used illegally, but they are
still out cash. Also, every business has to sign contracts for legitimate
purposes such as leases, contractors, copiers, the office refrigerator, etc.
If the government is the one doling out the cash, these legitimate
creditors may not be entitled to file a claim as victims, and may have to
hope for leftovers from the bankruptcy trustee when it is all over.
In some recent cases, the judges allowed the trustee to handle the
Restitution and remission proceedings
distribution of funds. 173
essentially mimic the bankruptcy proceedings but rest upon different
statutory and substantive procedures than bankruptcy distribution. Some
judges find greater efficiency in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
Eleventh Circuit explained this in United States v. Shefton, when it said:
We recognize the government argues that the Fund is not entitled to a
constructive trust because the Fund has an adequate remedy at law
based on the Attorney General’s authority, pursuant to § 853(i)(1), to
remit forfeiture “in the interest of justice.” However, § 853(i)(1)
remission is a non-judicial remedy left entirely to the discretion of the
Attorney General. DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175,
186-87 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 185-86
(3d Cir. 1991). Under Georgia law, equitable remedies, such as
constructive trusts, are not precluded by the existence of an alternate
remedy that is “not as complete or effectual as the equitable relief.”
O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4. Given that § 853(i)(1) leaves to the government,
which holds the forfeited property, full and unreviewable discretion as
to whether it will release some or all of it, § 853(i)(1) remission is
certainly not as complete or effectual as the equitable relief of a
constructive trust. Thus, we conclude that the Fund has, under these
facts, established an entitlement to a constructive trust on the Forfeited
Property.

In this case, restitution was better left to state law on constructive trusts
rather than forfeiture proceedings.
A partnership between the
government and bankruptcy trustee must be forged to exploit the
strengths of both. The government is good at identifying the fraud,
seizing the assets, and bringing the prosecution. One court has implied
that bankruptcy proceedings are the more efficient means of dealing with

173

People with an interest in the forfeited property will most likely be creditors of the estate;
but, it is important to note that people may receive more from the forfeiture proceeding than from the
bankruptcy case, either through retaining the property or through restitution proceedings, hence their
incentive to challenge bankruptcy distribution.
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the estate, 174 but these cases are not one-size-fits all, and it remains that
forfeiture may be the better course in some cases while bankruptcy gains
the advantage in another.
CONCLUSION
Forfeiture statutes are helpful for collecting assets in Ponzi schemes.
Once fraud enters the picture, the government has the long arm of the
law on its side and it can, almost immediately, begin to seize assets
related to the Ponzi scheme. But bankruptcy avoidance actions can also
marshal and distribute property of the estate. Both sets of rules can in
many instances create a fair division between all creditors and victims.
The two sides may never agree on who should win, but at least there is
recognition between the two camps that more can be done to reconcile
the approach of two very different systems in the same case.

174

Frykholm, 362 F.3d at 417 (“Neither side paid much attention to the effect of the
fraudulent conveyance, likely because both sides are represented by forfeiture specialists and have
focused on the language of § 853 and opinions interpreting that statute. Everything would have been
clearer had the United States initiated an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against Frykholm [the
Fraudster]. That not only would have brought to the fore § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code but also
would have provided a superior way to marshal [the fraudster’s] remaining assets and distribute
them to her creditors. Although § 853(n)(1) allows the Attorney General to use forfeited assets for
restitution, it does not create a comprehensive means of collecting and distributing assets.
Bankruptcy would have made it pellucid that Cotswold [the creditor] cannot enjoy any priority over
the other victims and cannot reap a profit while [the fraudster’s] other creditors go begging.
Moreover, bankruptcy would have enabled the trustee to recoup the sums distributed to the first
generation of investors . . . . Those payments could have been reclaimed under the trustee’s avoiding
powers and made available to all of the bilked investors. It is too late to pursue the profits . . . , but it
is not too late to prevent the preferential distribution of any further assets to favored investors.”
(emphasis added)).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss4/7

28

Gabel et al.: Measuring Bankruptcy Avoidance Action

616

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

APPENDIX A
I.

RESTORATION AND GRANTING OF REMISSION AND MITIGATION 1
(3)
(xi) Restoration of proceeds from sale
(A) A petition for restoration of the proceeds from the sale
of forfeited property, or for the appraised value of forfeited
property when the forfeited property has been retained by or
delivered to a government agency for official use, may be
submitted by an owner or lienholder in cases in which the
petitioner:
(1) Did not know of the seizure prior to the entry of a
declaration of forfeiture; and
(2) Could not reasonably have known of the seizure
prior to the entry of a declaration of forfeiture.
(B) Such a petition shall be submitted pursuant to
paragraphs (j)(3)(ii) through (v) of this section within ninety
(90) days from the date the property is sold or otherwise
disposed of.

(4) Petitions in judicial forfeiture cases—
(i) Procedure for filing petition. If the forfeiture proceedings are
judicial, a petition for remission or mitigation of a judicial
forfeiture shall be addressed to the Attorney General; shall be
sworn to by the petitioner or by the petitioner’s attorney upon
information and belief, supported by the client’s sworn notice of
representation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746; and shall be submitted
to the United States Attorney for the district in which the judicial
forfeiture proceedings are brought. A petitioner also shall submit
a copy of the petition to the Chief Postal Inspector if the Postal
Inspection Service was the seizing agency.
(ii) Ruling. Department of Justice regulations on petitions for
remission or mitigation in judicial forfeiture cases are stated in 29
CFR § 9.4.
1

39 C.F.R. §§ 233.7(j)(3)(xi), (4), (5) (Westlaw 2012).
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(5) Criteria governing administrative remission and mitigation—
(i) Remission.
(A) The Ruling Official shall not grant remission of a
forfeiture unless the petitioner establishes that:
(1) The petitioner has a valid, good faith and legally
cognizable interest in the seized property as owner or
lienholder as defined in these regulations; and
(2) The petitioner is innocent within the meaning of the
innocent owner provisions of the applicable civil
forfeiture statute, is a bona fide purchaser for value
without cause to believe that the property was subject
to forfeiture at the time of the purchase, or is one who
held a legally cognizable interest in the seized property
at the time of the violation underlying the forfeiture
superior to that of the defendant within the meaning of
the applicable criminal forfeiture statute, and is thereby
entitled to recover his or her interest in the forfeited
property by statute. (If the applicable civil forfeiture
statute contains no innocent owner defense, the
innocent owner provisions applicable to 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(4) shall apply.) Unless otherwise provided by
statute, in the case of petitioners who acquired their
interest in the property after the time of the violation
underlying the forfeiture, the question of whether the
petitioner had knowledge of the violation shall be
determined as of the point in time when the interest in
the property was acquired.
(B) The knowledge and responsibilities of petitioner’s
representative, agent, or employee in paragraph
(j)(5)(i)(A)(2) of this section are imputed to the petitioner
where the representative, agent, or employee was acting in
the course of his or her employment and in furtherance of
the petitioner’s business.
(C) The petitioner has the burden of establishing the basis
for granting a petition for remission or mitigation of
forfeited property, a restoration of proceeds of sale or
appraised value of forfeited property, or a reconsideration of
a denial of such a petition. Failure to provide information or
documents and to submit to interviews, as requested, may
result in a denial of the petition.
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(D) The Ruling Official shall presume a valid forfeiture and
shall not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the forfeiture.
(E) Willful, materially false statements or information, made
or furnished by the petitioner in support of a petition for
remission or mitigation of forfeited property, the restoration
of proceeds or appraised value of forfeited property, or the
reconsideration of a denial of any such petition, shall be
grounds for denial of such petition and possible prosecution
for the filing of false statements.
(ii) Mitigation.
(A) The Ruling Official may grant mitigation to a party not
involved in the commission of the offense underlying
forfeiture:
(1) Where the petitioner has not met the minimum
conditions for remission, but the Ruling Official finds
that some relief should be granted to avoid extreme
hardship and that return of the property combined with
imposition of monetary and/or other conditions of
mitigation in lieu of a complete forfeiture will promote
the interest of justice and will not diminish the
deterrent effect of the law. Extenuating circumstances
justifying such a finding include those circumstances
that reduce the responsibility of the petitioner for
knowledge of the illegal activity, knowledge of the
criminal record of a user of the property, or failure to
take reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use or
acquisition by another for some reason, such as a
reasonable fear of reprisal; or
(2) Where the minimum standards for remission have
been satisfied but the overall circumstances are such
that, in the opinion of the Ruling Official, complete
relief is not warranted.
(B) The Ruling Official may in his or her discretion grant
mitigation to a party involved in the commission of the
offense underlying the forfeiture where certain mitigating
factors exist, including, but not limited to: The lack of a
prior record or evidence of similar criminal conduct; if the
violation does not include drug distribution, manufacturing,
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or importation, the fact that the violator has taken steps, such
as drug treatment, to prevent further criminal conduct; the
fact that the violation was minimal and was not part of a
larger criminal scheme; the fact that the violator has
cooperated with federal, state, or local investigations
relating to the criminal conduct underlying the forfeiture; or
the fact that complete forfeiture of an asset is not necessary
to achieve the legitimate purposes of forfeiture.
(C) Mitigation may take the form of a monetary condition or
the imposition of other conditions relating to the continued
use of the property, and the return of the property, in
addition to the imposition of any other costs that would be
chargeable as a condition to remission. This monetary
condition is considered as an item of cost payable by the
petitioner, and shall be deposited into the Postal Service
Fund as an amount realized from forfeiture in accordance
with the applicable statute. If the petitioner fails to accept
the Ruling Official’s mitigation decision or any of its
conditions, or fails to pay the monetary amount within
twenty (20) days of the receipt of the decision, the property
shall be sold, and the monetary amount imposed and other
costs chargeable as a condition to mitigation shall be
subtracted from the proceeds of the sale before transmitting
the remainder to the petitioner.

II.

FORFEITURE PROCESS
(A) The steps of forfeiture are:
(1) Seizure 2
(2) Notice 3
(3) Forfeiture Proceeding 4
(4) Recovery 5

2

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (b)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
See also 39 C.F.R. § 233.7 (Westlaw 2012).
4
See Criminal and Civil forfeiture proceedings supra.
5
See Infra Appendix A.III.
3
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III. ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS 6
(c) Ancillary Proceeding; Entering a Final Order of Forfeiture
(1) In General. If, as prescribed by statute, a third party files a
petition asserting an interest in the property to be forfeited, the
court must conduct an ancillary proceeding, but no ancillary
proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of
a money judgment.
(A) In the ancillary proceeding, the court may, on motion,
dismiss the petition for lack of standing, for failure to state a
claim, or for any other lawful reason. For purposes of the
motion, the facts set forth in the petition are assumed to be
true.
(B) After disposing of any motion filed under Rule
32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the
petition, the court may permit the parties to conduct
discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if the court determines that discovery is necessary
or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery ends,
a party may move for summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
(2) Entering a Final Order. When the ancillary proceeding
ends, the court must enter a final order of forfeiture by amending
the preliminary order as necessary to account for any third-party
rights. If no third party files a timely petition, the preliminary
order becomes the final order of forfeiture if the court finds that
the defendant (or any combination of defendants convicted in the
case) had an interest in the property that is forfeitable under the
applicable statute. The defendant may not object to the entry of
the final order on the ground that the property belongs, in whole

6

FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.2. states that as soon
as practicable after a verdict or finding of guilty “the court must determine what property is subject
to forfeiture under the applicable statute.” This is known as the preliminary order of forfeiture. The
preliminary order of forfeiture is a prerequisite to the commencement of the ancillary hearings where
the third party rights are adjudicated. The preliminary order of forfeiture becomes a final order if no
party brings a successful ancillary challenge. The purpose of the ancillary proceeding is to prevent
“the inadvertent forfeiture of property in which the defendant had no interest.” See United States v.
Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 347 (2009) (citing a statement
in United States v. Elmes, 532 F.3d 1138, 1144 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008) that “[a]lthough not binding, the
interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes are nearly universally accorded great weight in
interpreting federal rules.”).
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or in part, to a codefendant or third party; nor may a third party
object to the final order on the ground that the third party had an
interest in the property.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss4/7

34

Gabel et al.: Measuring Bankruptcy Avoidance Action

622

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

APPENDIX B
I.

FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS AND OBLIGATIONS 7
(a)
(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to
or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of
an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including
any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an
employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which
the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted;
or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii)(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was
about to engage in business or a transaction, for which
any property remaining with the debtor was an
unreasonably small capital;
(ii)(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor
would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s
ability to pay as such debts matured; or
(ii)(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an
insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit
of an insider, under an employment contract and not in
the ordinary course of business.

7

11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (Westlaw 2012).
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(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious
or charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in any case in which—
(A) the amount of that contribution does not exceed 15
percent of the gross annual Income of the debtor for the year
in which the transfer of the contribution is made; or
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the
percentage amount of gross annual income specified in
subparagraph (A), if the transfer was consistent with the
practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions.

(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date
of the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such
transfer or obligation.
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this
section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a
transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest
transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may
be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the
debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
(d)
(1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such
transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be
perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred
that is superior to the interest in such property of the transferee,
but if such transfer is not so perfected before the commencement
of the case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition.

(2) In this section—
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(A) “value” means property, or satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not
include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the
debtor or to a relative of the debtor;
(B) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant,
stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or
securities clearing agency that receives a margin payment,
as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or
settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this
title, takes for value to the extent of such payment;
(C) a repo participant or financial participant that receives a
margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this
title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this
title, in connection with a repurchase agreement, takes for
value to the extent of such payment;
(D) a swap participant or financial participant that receives a
transfer in connection with a swap agreement takes for value
to the extent of such transfer; and
(E) a master netting agreement participant that receives a
transfer in connection with a master netting agreement or
any individual contract covered thereby takes for value to
the extent of such transfer, except that, with respect to a
transfer under any individual contract covered thereby, to
the extent that such master netting agreement participant
otherwise did not take (or is otherwise not deemed to have
taken) such transfer for value.
(3) In this section, the term “charitable contribution” means a
charitable contribution, as that term is defined in section 170(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution—
(A) is made by a natural person; and

(B) consists of—
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(i) a financial instrument (as that term is defined in
section 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986); or
(ii) cash.
(4) In this section, the term “qualified religious or charitable
entity or organization” means—
(A) an entity described in section 170(c)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) an entity or organization described in section 170(c)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(e)
(1) In addition to any transfer that the trustee may otherwise
avoid, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property that was made on or within 10 years before the
date of the filing of the petition, if—
(A) such transfer was made to a self-settled trust or similar
device;
(B) such transfer was by the debtor;
(C) the debtor is a beneficiary of such trust or similar
device; and
(D) the debtor made such transfer with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was
or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made,
indebted.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, a transfer includes a
transfer made in anticipation of any money judgment, settlement,
civil penalty, equitable order, or criminal fine incurred by, or
which the debtor believed would be incurred by—
(A) any violation of the securities laws (as defined in section
3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(47))), any State securities laws, or any regulation or
order issued under Federal securities laws or State securities
laws; or
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(B) fraud, deceit, or manipulation in a fiduciary capacity or
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered under section 12 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o(d)) or under
section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77f).
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